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1. Introduction
In the last decades, international markets have been characterized by two intercon-
nected phenomena. On the one hand, the world economy has experienced a never reached 
level of integration through an impressive growth of international trade and capital flows. 
This has been largely the result of trade and financial liberalization within the GATT-WTO 
system (see Caliendo et al., 2015), as well as of the ICT (Information and Communication 
Technology) revolution that shaped a profound reorganization of the world economy. 
On the other hand, a second phenomenon – the subject of this paper – has been 
the global proliferation of government regulatory activities mainly related to process and 
product standards, such as technical, quality and environmental regulations.1 Trade econ-
1 A parallel trend is related to the explosion of private and voluntary standards set by business groups and large retail-
ers finalized, among other things, to better coordinate modern global value chain (see Beghin et al., 2015; Swinnen 
et al., 2015). However, because this paper refers on the political economy of regulatory protection, the focus will be 
mainly on public standards. Among others, see McCluskey and Winfree (2009) and Vandemoortele and Deconinck 
(2015) on the interaction between private and public standards, also from a political economy perspective. 
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omists have called this trend “regulatory protection”, referring to the myriad of cost-rais-
ing, behind-the-border measures, that keep substantially inhibiting trade (Baldwin, 2000; 
Staiger, 2012). According to the UNCTAD, these policy measures are “non-tariff measures 
(NTMs) other than ordinary customs tariffs, that can potentially have economic effects on 
international trade in goods, changing quantities traded, prices or both”. 
NTMs are de jure regulations, prima facie imposed to protect consumers from 
unhealthy or low quality products and the environment from environmental damages. 
These measures should be the first- or second-best instruments to achieve public policy 
objectives, such as market failures, information asymmetries and imperfect competition 
(WTO, 2012). However, de facto they often induce an increase in trade costs acting as 
conventional barriers to trade (WTO, 2012; Orefice, 2015; Beghin et al., 2015a).2 
In what follows, I propose a review of the literature on the political economy of trade and 
regulatory standards, considering both conceptual models and the empirical evidence, with 
special emphasis on environmental and food standards. These specific regulatory measures 
represent just a sub-set of NTMs. However, in the last decades they became largely the most 
important and diffuse type of regulatory standards affecting trade in the agri-food sector. 
The key objective is not just to systematically survey the current literature. Indeed, 
given the importance and the complexity of the field, this issue has been already surveyed 
from different points of view by several recent contributions, including Baldwin (2000), 
Oates and Portney (2003), Sturm (2003), WTO (2012), Beghin et al. (2015a) and Swinnen 
et al. (2015). I focus instead on what I believe are some of the key contributions of the 
political economy of trade policy as extended to product and environmental regulations. 
In doing that, I give emphasis also to the implications stemming from considering trade 
models with firm heterogeneity, the emerging issue of international trading rules over 
standards and the role of global value chain.
The paper is organized as follows. After a short overview on the recent diffusion of 
NTMs (Section 2), I introduce the basic logic behind the political economy approach 
(Section 3). Then, I discuss shortly the efficiency, distributional and trade consequences of 
standards (Section 4). Next, I present the leading approaches to endogenous trade policy 
formation and their extensions to quality and environmental standards (Section 5). Final-
ly, I discuss the problem of negotiating international trading rules over NTMs, also in the 
context of modern global value chains (Section 6). The conclusions discuss the implica-
tions in considering regulatory policies as endogenous, suggesting future research avenues. 
2. Stylized facts about NTMs 
In this section I consider the definition of non-tariff measures and some emerging 
evidence about their diffusion and their trade effects.
2.1 Definition and quantification of standards
As the term suggests, NTMs are policy measures other than tariffs that can affect 
trade flows. They can usefully be divided into three categories (Staiger, 2012). 
2 Note, however, that by providing more information about a given good, or by improving the characteristics of 
the good itself, several NTMs may be also a catalyst for trade (see, e.g., Disdier et al., 2008; Maertens and Swin-
nen, 2009; Olper et al., 2014). 
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A first category of NTMs includes those imposed on imports, including import quo-
tas, import prohibitions, import licensing, customs procedures and administration fees. A 
second category is made up by those imposed on exports, such as export taxes, export 
subsidies, export quotas, and export prohibitions. These first two categories encompass 
NTMs that are applied at the border, either to imports or to exports. A third category of 
NTMs, the focus of this review, includes those imposed internally in the domestic econ-
omy, also called behind-the-border measures. This category embraces domestic legisla-
tion covering an increasing numbers of product characteristics, such as technical, safety, 
environmental, health, nutrition, and labor standards, as well as internal taxes and domes-
tic subsidies.3 In what follows, the main focus is on behind-the-border standards, and in 
particular on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) standards and Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT), disciplined in the WTO by the respective SPS and TBT Agreements. 
Within behind-the-border measures a classical distinction is between product stand-
ards and process standards. Product standards have to do with the characteristics of 
goods, in particular with respect to aspects such as quality and safety, e.g. the maximum 
content of methyl mercury in fish. Process standards instead apply to the condition under 
which goods are produced, packaged, or refined, e.g. dairy product without hormones. A 
related distinction is between vertical and horizontal standards. Vertical standards involve 
regulations that can readily be characterized by being more or less stringent. As an exam-
ple, the EU versus US legislation on growth hormone in beef or on aflatoxin, with the first 
being more stricter than the second. This kind of legislation is more complex because it 
exerts emotion and a strong media attention as it is identified as protecting local consum-
ers from low-quality imports (Baldwin, 2000).
Horizontal standards, however, are often more common especially in non-food manu-
facturing goods. In this case, a typical example is the difference in electric plugs around 
the world. Note that, when two countries have such horizontal standards, the differences 
tend to create reciprocal trade barriers.
To date, the most comprehensive information of different NTMs, comes from the 
countries’ notifications at the WTO, currently collected in the I-TIP database. Although 
still problematic, the WTO data have the advantage to offer a comprehensive picture 
across countries, over time and also among different types of NTMs.4 Moreover, as recent-
ly shown by the WTO 2012 Report on NTMs (WTO, 2012), other databases, such as the 
UNCTAD-Trains or the firm-level survey collections of the World Bank, broadly confirm 
the NTMs patterns of the WTO data. 
As far as December 2015, the SPS and TBT measures notified to the WTO were 
11,174 and 18,279, respectively. This number is very high compared to all others (border) 
NTMs, equal to about 5,500. Currently, SPS and TBT measures represent approximately 
3 Note moreover that, any standard needs a peculiar testing procedure to check the extent to which products are 
in compliance with the standard. The existence of asymmetry in this testing procedure could create further trade 
costs and tensions in trade relations, as it happened between the UE and Japan in the 1990s (Baldwin, 2000). 
4 As explained by the WTO I-TIP database, the difference between notifications vs. measures in force is problem-
atic because the same measure can be notified through several notifications, or several measures can be notified 
in only one notification. Moreover, another lack comes from the fact that very rarely countries notify the with-
draw of the measures, and moreover members have not the obligation to notify all measures imposed. Hence, it 
is not so clear if the number of the SPS and TBT measures notified to the WTO are inflated or underestimated, 
although the former hypothesis appears more likely. 
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85% of all the NTMs notified to the WTO. This is the trend resulting over the last two 
decades during which border NTMs have significantly decreased, while SPS and TBT 
measures have strongly increased (Figure 1). The growing importance of SPS and TBT 
standards is confirmed by other data sources. For example, considering the UNCTAD-
Trains data, in 1994 about 55% of all NTMs were classified as SPS or TBT, a number that 
increased up to 85% in 2004 (Beghin, 2006). Similarly, for the US, data from 2014 NTMs 
reveal a share of SPS and TBT measures higher than 85% (Pacca and Olper, 2016). 
Starting from 2005, the growth of NTMs does not show a clear trend, although in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis they started increasing again. Yet, in the last period, SPS 
Figure 1. SPS and TBT notifications 1995-2010 (# of notifying countries and measures).
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and TBT measures are still growing in their importance (WTO, 2012). A significant con-
firmation of the SPS/TBT intensification comes from the inspection of the so called “Spe-
cific Trade Concerns” (STC). These are formal complaints raised by WTO members to the 
SPS and TBT Committee on particular trade inhibiting standards. The STC concerning 
both SPS and TBT measures have increased significantly from 1995 to 2010 (Figures 2 
and 3). Such trend has been confirmed in the last years.
SPS and TBT measures are mainly raised by developed countries, even if some impor-
tant emerging economies have been particularly active in the recent period (e.g. China, 
Figure 2. # SPS Specific Trade Concerns (STC) “Maintaining” and “Raising” countries as a share of the 
total number of countries by the level of development. 
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India and Brazil). Considering again STC, developed countries do not only maintain the 
largest number of STC in place, but they are also the most active in raising complaints 
against SPS/TBT measures (Figures 2 and 3). This pattern appears to be in line with the 
broad picture coming from the World Bank surveys, where implementation issues relat-
ed to standards are the most important source of concerns for exporters from developing 
countries toward developed ones. 
Figure 3. # TBT Specific Trade Concerns (STC) “Maintaining” and “Raising” countries as a share of the 
total number of countries by the level of development.
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2.2 Trade effect of NTMs
The key question concerning standards is not just their (likely) trade effects, but their 
overall welfare effects. Yet, as a matter of fact, the large part of the empirical literature over 
NTMs and standards has focused its attention mainly on the more simplistic issue of the 
trade effect.5 
From this point of view, the extent to which the large diffusion of NTMs, and in par-
ticular of SPS/TBT measures, negatively affects trade flows, is not out of contention (see 
WTO (2012) for a recent survey). While many studies showed that, at least on average, 
NTMs significantly reduce trade flows (see Disdier et al., 2008; Olper and Raimondi, 
2008; Vigani et al., 2012), SPS measures, and more often TBT standards, could be trade 
and quality enhancing, especially when harmonized and/or voluntary technical standards 
are considered (see Moenius, 2004; Shepherd, 2007; Olper et al., 2014). 
To rationalize the large and contrasting literature on the trade effect of standards, 
Li and Beghin (2012) have recently proposed a meta-analysis of the trade effects of SPS 
and TBT measures. Main results showed that: international trade in agricultural and food 
products tends to be more impeded by these barriers in comparison to trade in manu-
facturing; SPS regulations affect negatively trade in agriculture and food products coming 
from developing countries toward rich countries, and less between rich countries; finally, 
the trade effects of other technical regulations are more uncertain. 
The most recent empirical literature on the trade effects of NTMs started to shed new 
light on two important questions. First, their effect on the probability to export consider-
ing firm level trade. Second, the old but still unresolved issue of the interaction between 
tariffs and NTMs. 
The extent to which SPS/TBT standards, other than the volume of trade, also 
affect the number of firms entering in the export market – the extensive trade margin 
– has been recently addressed by Fontagnè et al. (2015). By matching France custom 
trade data with SPS specific trade concerns raised by the EU against its trading part-
ners, these authors find three important results. Firstly, the probability of firm exiting 
from the export market is higher in SPS-imposing foreign markets. Secondly, the value 
exported by each firm is decreasing in the presence of SPS, but instead the export unit 
values (a proxy for price) are increasing. Hence, compliance with new SPS standards 
may require additional fixed costs to adapt the production process. Finally and inter-
estingly, these negative effects of SPS on the intensive and extensive trade margins are 
significantly attenuated when large firms are considered. All these stylized facts are 
consistent with the SPS-induced redistribution of market shares from small toward 
large firms, predicted by firms heterogeneity trade models (Abel-Koch, 2013). We will 
come back on this point shortly.
A second important issue is the relation between standards and tariffs (Figures 4 and 
5). Globalization and the diffusion of standards are clearly two interconnected phenom-
ena. However, understanding whether custom tariffs and standards, and more in general 
NTMs, are substitutes or complements is a challenge. The existing empirical evidence, 
although scarce, seems to support more the substitution hypothesis. However, there is 
5 See Disdier and Marette (2010) for one of the few contributions that investigated simultaneously the trade and 
welfare effects of SPS standards.
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Figure 4. SPS trade concerns and applied tariff level 1996-2010. 
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Figure 5. TBT trade concerns and applied tariff level 1996-2010. 
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also evidence of complementarity in the literature (see Ray, 1981; Goldberg and Pavcnik, 
2005). The work by Kee et al. (2009) perhaps represents the most compelling evidence on 
the substitutability between tariff and the Ad-Valorem Equivalent (AVE) of NTMs. Using 
cross-sectional data for 91 countries, they find support to the substitutability hypothesis. 
Yet, given the conceptual difficulty and the huge data problems in transforming the NTM 
trade effects in their respective AVE (Beghin et al., 2015b)6, cross-sectional evidence can-
not be taken as definitive answer. 
Beverelli et al. (2014) make an important contribution by exploiting the cross-country 
and time-series dimension of SPS/TBT specific trade concerns. Interestingly, considering 
these specific measures, they find a strong confirmation of the substitutability hypothe-
sis, meaning that SPS and TBT standards are raised in response to a tariff cut, and this is 
especially true in developed countries where the cost of meeting the standards (for home 
firms) is relatively lower.7 Instead, their findings support a complementarity relationship 
between tariffs and TBT in developing countries, while not for SPS, where the substitu-
tion effect prevails also in developing countries. All these results have implications for the 
political economy of standards.
Finally, an important point is to recognize that the mere fact that SPS/TBT standards 
restrict trade and competition is by no means an argument for their removal (Swinnen 
et al., 2015). Good governance requires regulation to protect environment, health, safety 
and well-being of citizens, animals, plants as well as to facilitate market transactions and 
global value chains. However, as many evidence and trade disputes have already showed, 
the problem with standards is the difficulty to know whether a particular regulation serves 
the public or the protectionists’ interest and indeed, both motives are often combined in a 
single SPS/TBT (Baldwin, 2000). 
3. A general political economy framework 
Figure 6 presents a stylized view of the democratic policymaking. Starting from the 
box and arrows on the right in the figure, voters and interest groups in society have con-
flicting preferences over trade policy. Political institutions – i.e. electoral rules, forms of 
government and decision rules – aggregate these preferences into specific political out-
comes. This result translates into ad hoc political incentives, transforming economic and 
political interests in economic policy decisions, such as trade policies, by interacting with 
private interests and decision rules.
Moving to the box and arrows on the left of Figure 6, trade policies interact with mar-
kets influencing the prices of different goods, and factors’ return in different industries 
(and/or firms). These market outcomes will affect individual preferences over trade policy 
depending on the sources of individual income. The economic (left) and political (right) 
boxes of the figure are occasionally called the “Demand side” and the “Supply side” of the 
political market, respectively (see Rodrik, 1995). 
6 Beghin et al. (2015b) showed that the NTM AVE estimates of Kee et al. (2009), being based on the (assumed) 
restriction that NTMs can affect only negatively trade flows, may be distorted upward. By modelling the (pos-
sible) externalities addressed by NTMs, they confirmed this statement quantitatively. 
7 See also the contribution of Orefice (2015), who studied the relationship between STC and tariff variation from 
the point of view of the exporting country raising SPS/TBT specific trade concerns.
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Until recently, models have treated analytically mainly the left box and arrows of the 
figure, considering the right box largely as implicit components. Yet, in the last decade 
economists have started to look seriously also to the right box – traditionally a domain 
of political scientists – by developing political economic models of different democratic 
(and autocratic) institutions, with the aim of formally addressing how different institu-
tional structures affect political outcomes and, in turn, economic policy and growth.8 
Given the complexity of the issue, a satisfactory treatment of all these factors is hard, in 
the sense that a complete political economic model would be intractable. Hence, apart 
few notable exceptions,9 political economy models used to study the formation of trade-
related regulatory policy leaves implicit some of the right-hand side elements of the 
structure summarized above. 
Every political economy model of trade-related policy starts from the economic 
domain. This is important because the interaction between trade policy, markets and 
economic outcomes (left box) is at the heart of coalitions formation over government 
policy. The simplest approach, still used nowadays, is the one of a small open economy 
based on the Ricardo-Viner (specific-factors) or on the Heckscher-Ohlin trade model.10 
8 Comprehensive reviews of these comparative political economy studies can be find in Persson and Tabellini 
(2000) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2006). Empirical evidence of the effect of political institutions on policy 
outcomes is reported in Persson and Tabellini (2003) for macroeconomic policy, Fredriksson and Millimet 
(2004) for environmental policy and Olper and Raimondi (2013) for agricultural and food policy.
9 Considering trade policy, models of Grossman and Helpman (2005) and Zissimoss (2014) are examples going 
in that direction. The first considers the formation of trade policy in a democracy comparing majoritarian ver-
sus proportional electoral rules. The latter develop a political economic model of trade policy under autocracy 
and democracy, by merging the Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) model of democracy with the Heckscher-Ohlin 
trade model. 
10 In the Ricardian model, everybody gains from trade and loses from trade protection, since there is a single 
factor of production (labor). Hence, no clear domestic coalition will emerge having a real interest to depart from 
Figure 6. The democratic policymaking process. 
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These neoclassic approaches have the advantage to predict stark distributional conse-
quences of trade policy and thus to clear-cut predictions about who gains and who loses 
from protection, pointing to coalitions formation that have conflicting interests on trade 
policy (Hillman, 1989).11 
As it is well known, within this perfectly-competitive small open economy frame-
work, whatever the (neo-classical) trade model is chosen, free-trade is the optimal trade 
policy for the welfare maximizer government. In this framework, any deviation from free-
trade should be labelled as “protectionist”, and is the result of a self-interested government 
who cares about its own welfare - such as (re)-election - and uses trade policy to transfer 
resources to special interests with that purpose (Hillman, 1989).
4. Modelling the economic effect of standards
The basic framework outlined above, although useful, does not work clearly in the 
presence of regulatory standards introduced to address consumption (or production) 
externalities. This is because domestic regulations, such as food safety and environmental 
standards, by adding technological constraints on how goods can be produced (e.g. genet-
ic modified technology, or the use of hormon in cattle breeding), have complex effects on 
both the trade patterns and the firms’ competititive environment, other than on consumer 
welfare. For this reason, understanding the extent to which a regolatory standard can be 
labeled as “protectionist”, is often a complex issue driven by the nature of the standard 
itself and the (trade) model assumptions. 
Before moving to an open economy, it is useful to address shortly the main effects of 
a standard in a closed economy. Consider a product standard that address a consump-
tion externality, as studied by Swinnen et al. (2015) and many others. The introduction of 
this standard has both efficiency (welfare) and equity effects. In particular, social welfare 
increases when consumers gain exceeds producers implementation costs, and vice-versa. 
However, standards always induce rent distribution between consumers and producers, as 
well as among producers when firms differ in their implementation costs. Thus, due to the 
distributional effects of standards, different groups in the society have different interests 
towards them, raising political economy problems. 
4.1 The economic effect of standards in an open economy
One of the first theoretical contributions on the economic effect of product standards 
is proposed by Fischer and Serra (2000), who studied the impact of a minimum quality 
standard on Home and Foreign firms, modelling a duopoly in a homogeneous goods set-
free trade. Yet, things change considering neo-Ricardian models with firms heterogeneity (see Eaton and Kor-
tum, 2002; Arkolakis, 2010). 
11 Within the Ricardo-Viner model the consequence of trade policy can be clearly traced knowing the individu-
als’ factors ownership in the import-competing and export sectors. A tariff in the import-competing sector leads 
to an increase in the return of the specific factor, while reducing the return of the specific factor used in the 
export sectors. In the Heckscher-Ohlin model, the effect of a tariff works along factors (not sectors) lines, i.e. the 
Stolper-Samuelson theorem. An import tariff increases the return to the scarce factor and reduce the return to 
the abundant factor. 
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ting, under the small country assumption. The modeled standard is reflected in a change 
in the level of a negative consumption externality, along the line of Copeland and Taylor 
(1995). The authors’ main conclusion is that, in the presence of a consumption externality, 
e.g. pollution, the standard chosen by the domestic social planner is always protectionist. 
This is because, on the one hand, rents can be transferred from the foreign to the home 
producer due to the increase in market power of the domestic firm, and on the other 
hand, part of the cost in reducing the (domestic) externality is absorbed by the foreign 
producer. These result motivate the authors’ definition of a protectionist standard as “one 
that is higher than the standard the social planner would choose if all firms were domes-
tic.” (Fischer and Serra, 2000).12 
Marette and Beghin (2010) question this conclusion. Specifically, within a simi-
lar framework, they analyze the introduction of a domestic standard to address a con-
sumption externality, allowing heterogeneity of foreign and domestic firms in the cost of 
addressing the standard. In this setting, they argue that the welfare maximizing (domestic) 
standard chosen by the social planner can be anti-protectionist - i.e. lower than the stand-
ard which maximizes international welfare - when foreign producers are much more effi-
cient than domestic producers at addressing the externality. This conclusion is interesting 
because, at least within this model structure, it has consequences for the practical estima-
tion of the ad-valorem equivalent of a NTM, that would also be sensitive to the heteroge-
neity of costs structure in meeting the standards of the domestic and foreign firms. 
The two papers mentioned above refer to a particular type of NTM, namely a stand-
ard that accounts for a consumption externality. Hence, the natural question is on whether 
similar conclusions can be drawn by comparing different types of NTMs. Marette (2014), 
extends the previous analysis highlighting the complexity in characterizing protectionism – 
in the Fisher and Serra (2000) sense – in relation to different NTMs and producers’ costs 
structure. In particular, Marette (2014) analyzed two extreme cases where a standard can 
affect only variable costs or, alternatively, fixed costs, and where the home government, 
alternatively, could adopt a mandatory label to inform consumers.13 Under these assump-
tions, he showed that when the standard affects only variable costs, the introduction of a 
mandatory label can be protectionist. Differently, when the standard impacts only fixed-
costs, the standard can be protectionist.
These and other similar results and conclusions are mainly obtained in models with 
homogeneous goods and price-taker competitive firms (see Swinnen, 2015 for an exten-
sive survey). Yet, because NTMs systematically affect fixed firm’ costs other than variable 
costs, even a simplified model should conceptually require imperfect competition, increas-
ing returns and differentiated goods (Baldwin, 2000). Adding these more realistic features 
to the analysis, however, significantly increases the complexity and the source of ambiguity 
of the NTMs effect. This is deeply documented with several examples by Baldwin (2000), 
which represents, to date, one of the most interesting survey on the trade effect of NTMs. 
12 Essaji (2010) extends the Fisher and Serra’s model analyzing the simultaneous impact of trade liberalization on 
NTMs and showing that one cannot make an unequivocal connection between falling tariffs (or subsidies) and 
rising standards. Ultimately, this will depend on the government objective function, namely on the weight gov-
ernment attaches to different interests (see Section 5).
13 Note, in Marette (2014) because the introduction of the standard removes the externality, then it is alternative 
to the mandatory label.
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Furthermore, whenever NTMs involve fixed costs, it would be appropriate to analyze 
them within firms heterogeneity trade model. In fact, as summarized in Section 2.2, this 
is strongly supported by a growing empirical evidence showing that, although NTMs can 
sometimes affect positively the volume of trade, they systematically negatively affect the 
probability that a firm exports to a certain market destination (see WTO, 2012; Fontagnè 
et al., 2015). Moreover, considering firms’ heterogeneity, is particularly important from a 
political economy perspective, because it adds a new dimension to the possible coalition for-
mation in favor or against NTMs. In models with firms heterogeneity, indeed, conflicts of 
interests over trade policy, traditionally based on the cross-sectoral or cross-country dimen-
sion, are broken-down over the within-sector dimension depending on firms’ characteris-
tics, such as size and productivity. Interestingly, this is consistent with the observation that 
larger firms, as measured by sales, are systematically more active in lobby activities both in 
the US (Bombardini, 2008) and in the EU (Bernhagen and Mitchell, 2009; Belloc, 2015). For 
all these reasons the next section pays some attention to this more realistic setting.
4.2 Effects of standards when goods and firms are heterogeneous
When firms are heterogeneous and the standard involves also fixed costs, the latter 
affects differently Home (and Foreign) firms’ profitability, forcing the least efficient firms to 
exit. To see this, let’s consider the model of Abel-Koch (2013) who studied the economic 
effects of a standard in the Melitz (2003) model.14 
On the supply side, firms operate in a monopolistically competitive market with 
increasing returns to scale, using only one input, labor. Each firm produces one variety, 
with marginal costs ci. Trade between Home and Foreign is subject to both variable (ice-
berg) and fixed trade costs, τ and f, respectively. Given firms’ heterogeneity, the higher the 
firm marginal costs, the lower its sales on the domestic market. Hence, there exists a cutoff 
level of marginal costs, cH, defined by the zero profit condition, πH(cH) = 0, such that only 
Home firms with ci ≤ cH will be active on their domestic market. Similarly, for Foreign 
firms with ci ≤ cF.15
Next, let’s consider a standard which increases the fixed costs of accessing the Home 
market by a factor s > 1, such as food safety and health standards, and assume also that 
it has not beneficial effects on consumer welfare. Such standard has an anti-competitive 
effect because it forces the least efficient Home producers and Foreign exporters to exit 
from the Home market. This is because by reducing the respective cutoff level, cH (and cF), 
it will increase the minimum firm’s efficiency needed to operate with non-negative profit 
in the domestic market for both Home and Foreign firms. 
14 In Melitz (2003) consumers have identical preferences over a composite (numéraire) good and a continuum 
of varieties of a differentiated good, with constant elasticity of substitution (CES). This specification ensures that 
a variation of the number of product varieties affects directly the ideal price index, and thus welfare, i.e. Dixit-
Stigliz (1977) “love of variety” preferences. 
15 The model assumes that the distribution of marginal costs, c , follow a Pareto distribution of marginal pro-
ductivity 1/c, characterized by the shape (k) and the scale parameter ( a ). The shape parameter is a measure of 
the dispersion of firms efficiency, e.g. if kH < kF, it means that in Home the ratio of very efficient firms to rather 
inefficient firms is higher than in Foreign. Instead, the scale parameter defines the (positive) lower bound of the 
distribution. 
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As a result, the NTM induces a reduction in Home market competition, creating a gain 
in the market share of the most efficient firms (at the expense of the least efficient Home and 
Foreign firms) more than compensating the increase in their fixed costs (due to scale econo-
mies). This profit-shifting effect for the Home firms active in the domestic market is summa-
rized in Figure 7. A similar picture applying to Foreign firms exporting in the Home market.
With this model, the implementation of anti-competitive regulations can never be a 
social optimum because the potentially positive effect of the standard s on the aggregate 
profits of Home firms is always dominated by its negative effect on consumer surplus, due 
to the loss of the Home available varieties.16 Clearly, this conclusion could be reversed 
under the condition such that the standard is implemented to reduce a consumption 
externality, whenever the increase in the consumers’ surplus attributable to the externality 
reduction, more than compensate the decrease in the number of Home available varieties. 
4.3 Summary and implications 
From the above discussion we can derive some important considerations useful for 
the introduction of the political economy of standards. First, there is a huge economic 
16 The introduction of a NTM can also induce an across countries profit-shifting when industries in the two 
countries are characterized by differences in the shape parameter. Indeed, when kH < kF, the ratio of very efficient 
firms to rather inefficient firms and hence the ratio of winners to losers from the introduction of NTMs is higher 
in Home than in Foreign, implying that in the aggregate, profits are shifted from Foreign to Home firms. 
Figure 7. Introduction of a standard (s > 1) on the profits of Home firms.
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uncertainty over the true economic effects of a standard, because results are sensitive to 
the researcher’s modelling assumptions. This may raise problems in characterizing univo-
cally the conflict of interests over NTMs, that will depend on specific market conditions, 
heterogeneity of the costs structure and type of standard under investigation. Hence, gen-
eralizations are always difficult. 
Second, as shown by many WTO disputes on NTMs, there is a genuine uncertainty 
about the safety, health and environmental benefits of many regulations. This is because, 
frequently, the scientific consensus can rarely offer a conclusive answer to the effects gen-
erated by certain product or technology, especially in the initial phase of the introduction 
of a new technology (Sturm, 2006). Third, many modelling exercises often abstract from 
the precise characterization of the NTM, and thus considerable uncertainty will persist 
about the level of the welfare maximizing standard.17 
This uncertainty opens the door to interest groups and politicians opportunistic 
behaviors. In fact, politicians, who are electorally accountable for their policy choice, may 
prefer to implement the least efficient product standard to protect a domestic industry, as 
the uncertainty on the optimal level of standard translates into a lower electoral penalty 
for his policy choice. 
5. Political economy models 
Models of endogenous trade policy start from an economic model as the ones sum-
marized above, and relax the assumption of the (exogenous) welfare maximizer social 
planner (Rodrik, 1995). This is done, firstly by assuming that the objective function max-
imized by the government gives different preferences to certain distributional outcomes 
and, secondly, by assuming that voters and lobbying groups are able to transmit their par-
ticular preferences to shape the government’s behavior. 
Political economy models can be firstly distinguished in voting models, where the 
interaction is between unorganized voters and politicians, and lobbying models, where the 
interaction is among organized interest groups and politicians. The first typology assumes 
that political parties compete only for votes, with a framework based on some variations 
of the median voter model.18 The models presented by Mayer (1984) and List and Sturm 
(2006) are two examples with applications to trade policy and environmental regulation, 
respectively. 
The majority of models used to study both trade policy formation and the effect of 
environmental and food standards can be classified into interest groups or lobbying mod-
els, and have their roots in the Olson (1962) logic of collective action, the Stigler (1971) 
theory of economic regulation, and the Becker (1983) model of competition among pres-
17 Here the problem is similar to the Pigovian tax and the measurability problem of the externality. For example, 
Baumol (1972) argued that it is extraordinarily difficult to measure the social costs of any externality, especially 
because many costs are psychological and individual in nature. See also the discussion in Vaughn (1980), on the 
relevance of the subjective costs. 
18 The most important variations of the basic median voter model are models that assume probabilistic voting 
behavior (Coughlin, 1992), where voters’ intentions are uncertain, and political agency models, which stress the 
importance of (voters) imperfect information. For an in-depth treatment of the different voting models, see Pers-
son and Tabellini (2000). 
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sure groups. These models differ by the degree of micro-foundation in the interaction 
between lobbies and politicians, and by the extent to which they consider an explicit role 
for voters, elections and/or social welfare within the government objective function. There 
are different variations, surveyed by Rodrik (1995) and Helpman (1995). A further dis-
tinction is related to the motives of lobby groups, i.e. the electoral motive approach and 
the influence motive approach (Grossman and Helpman, 1994 and 1996). The first argues 
that lobbies wish to promote the candidate that reflects their preferences on a policy issue 
before upcoming elections. The second argues that lobbies aim at influencing the policy 
choice of an incumbent politician.
Currently, for several reasons discussed below, the leading approaches are still based 
on the menu-auction framework firstly proposed in the “Protection for Sale” model of 
Grossman and Helpman (1994), from now on the GH model. We start by summarizing 
the main intuition of the GH model, discussing its relevance for empirical analyses, and 
the most recent extensions to study the endogenous formation of NTMs. Next, we sum-
marize other recent prominent approaches based on electoral competition. 
5.1 The protection for sale framework 
Grossman and Helpman (1994) proposed a menu-auction model to study trade policy 
formation in the context of active pressure groups.19 The key model assumption is that the 
influence motives of pressure groups are at the heart of campaign contributions. The under-
lying economic framework is the one of the specific-factor model in a small open economy. 
Interest groups move first, offering politicians campaign contributions linked to their policy 
preferences, with the objective to maximize the group members’ economic return. Next, pol-
iticians decide on their policy stances, after knowing how campaign contributions are linked 
to their selected policies. Finally, the government will set the policy vector, t, that maximizes 
the objective function G(t). This is represented by a weighted sum of lobby group contribu-
tions, C, and the wellbeing of the population, W, G(t) = ϕW(t) + C(t), where ϕ is the weight 
the government places on the voters welfare relative to lobby contributions. 
GH showed that, at the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, trade policy is selected to 
maximize the joint surplus of all the parts involved. Hence, setting Πj(t) as the welfare 
of the specific-factor owners, the equilibrium trade policy is obtained by maximizing a 
weighted social-welfare function:20
∑φ( ) ( ) ( )= + Π
∈
t W t t Ω
j L
j . (1)
Equation (1) says that, in equilibrium, “truthful” contributions schedules by the inter-
est groups induce the government to behave as if it were maximizing a social-welfare 
19 The model of Peltzman (1976) and the derived political-support function approach of Hillman (1982), can be 
interpreted as reduce forms of the PFS model. See Helpman (1995) for an indebt discussion of these models and 
their link with the GH model, and its extension to electoral competition and international trade negotiations.
20 To solve the equilibrium lobbying game, GH rely on the Bernheim and Whinston (1986) subgame-perfect 
non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. These authors showed that the set of a lobby’s best responses to any combina-
tion of contribution schedules offered by all other lobbies always includes a “truthful” contribution schedule. 
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function that weights different members of the society differently, with individual rep-
resented by an interest group receiving a weight of 1 + ϕ, while those not represented 
receiving the smaller weight ϕ (Grossman and Helpman, 1994, 841).
The basic GH model has been firstly derived for trade taxes (tariffs and export subsi-
dies), but the same approach can be applied to other policy instruments as well, such as 
environmental policy (Fredriksson, 1997), import quota (Facchini et al., 2006), and food 
standards (Swinnen and Vandemoortele, 2008). Other important extensions implied the 
use of monopolistic competition, instead of the specific-factor model, and firms’ heteroge-
neity (Bombardini, 2008; Abel-Koch, 2013). 
The most important reason of the GH model success,21 other than its simplicity and 
elegance, is its micro-foundation for lobbying. Indeed, being built on sound economic 
principles, the model allows for a structural estimation of the theory and the underly-
ing structural parameters, and in particular the relative weight, ϕ. 22 Goldberg and Maggi 
(1999) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) tested for the first time the GH mod-
el in the context of the US industry protection, using non-tariff measures as protection 
variable.23 Their results strongly support the model predictions, namely that US industry 
protection structure is increasing in the (inverse) of import penetration ratio, but only 
for organized industries. Yet, the result of these and almost all the applications of the 
GH model is that the estimated structural parameter ϕ, the weight government attaches 
to social welfare, is much higher than the one attached to campaign contributions. This 
means that welfare carries a strong weight in government’s payoff, a conclusion that it is at 
odd with the model name “Protection for Sale”.24
5.2 Protection for sale and environmental standards 
One of the first applications of the GH model to the determination of domestic regu-
lations has been developed in the domain of environmental policy.25 Fredriksson (1997) 
modelled a production emission proportional to output. Emissions induce disutility to an 
organized subset of the population defined as “environmentalists” who lobby for reducing 
21 There are also criticisms to the GH model structure, and the possibility of testing it empirically. See in particu-
larly Rausser et al. (2011) and Ederington and Minier (2008), respectively. 
22 The model predicts that protection in organized industries is growing in the level of (inverse) import penetra-
tion, and is decreasing in the value of import demand elasticity (Ramsey rule). At the empirical level the main 
challenge is to estimate a lobby equation using campaign contributions and the import penetration equation, 
noting that both are simultaneously determined with the protection equation (see Goldberg and Maggi, 1999, 
for details). This last point, together with the low disposability of data on campaign contributions, represents the 
main difficulty in estimating the GH model. 
23 The use of NTMs instead of tariffs, the standard approach in the majority of the empirical test of the GH 
model, is the result of the following consideration. While tariffs are decided cooperatively within the GATT/
WTO negotiations, NTMs are largely decided unilaterally and, as such, this is more consistent with the non-
cooperative Nash equilibrium of the GH model. 
24 Note, this does not mean that the US government is a pure welfare maximizer. Recently, some authors sug-
gested that one reason can be related to firms’ heterogeneity (e.g. Bombardini, 2008), namely the fact that within 
the same industry firms lobby in opposite direction depending on their export (or import) status. However, to 
date we do not have a sound empirical test of this hypothesis. 
25 Note, several papers on the political economy of environmental policy, strictly speaking, focused on green tax-
es and subsidies more than on environmental standards per se. 
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them. As in the standard GH model the specific factor owners called “industrialists” are 
organized and lobbying the government, while the consumers are unorganized. 
In this setting, the government chooses an optimal environmental tax rate, t#, aiming 
at maximizing lobby contributions from the two organized interest groups - “environmen-
talists” (CE) and “industrialists” (CI) - conditional to overall welfare W:
φ φ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )= + +t C t C t W tΩ  E E I I , (2)
where ϕE and ϕI are the relative weights that government attaches to the environmental 
and industrial lobby groups, respectively. The welfare of the environmental and industrial 
groups depends on the share of total pollution tax revenue and labor income allocated 
to the respective lobby groups, the aggregate disutility from pollution of the environmen-
tal lobby group, and the aggregated profit of the industrial group. The main result of the 
paper shows that the political equilibrium environmental tax rate, t#, tends to be different 
from the (optimal) Pigouvian tax, t*, depending on the size of the two lobbies, their politi-
cal contributions, and the relative weight the government attaches to social welfare. 
Schleich (1999) adds an important extension to the above framework through the 
use of a trade tariff (or subsidy) within the available government policy instrument set, 
to study the interaction between green and trade policies. Main results show that, with a 
production externality, only the environmental subsidy will be implemented at the equi-
librium because the government, being sensitive to social welfare, has an incentive to 
implement the most efficient policy that will internalize the externality, in order to maxi-
mize campaign contributions from lobbies.26 Yet and quite paradoxically, environmental 
quality could be higher in a situation where only trade policy is available, because the 
additional distortion induced by the trade policy will damp the government’s income 
redistribution. See also Aidt (1998) and Schleich and Orden (2000) for similar results con-
sidering polluting inputs and a large country, respectively.
An important question studied within this strand of literature is the extent to which 
environmental tax or subsidy are affected by exogenous trade liberalization episodes. Fre-
driksson (1999) extended his lobby model by including an abatement technology and a tariff 
on the imported pollution good that is exogenously given. Key results show that trade liber-
alization has ambiguous effects on the environmental policy, mainly because tariff elimina-
tion reduces output in the pollution sector. Hence, environmental quality could increase or 
decrease after trade liberalization when political economy motives are taken into account. 
A further extension by Eliste and Fredriksson (2002) focuses on a situation where the 
government can use an environmental tax and a production subsidy for the pollution sec-
tor. The authors analyzed the effects of an exogenous increase in the green tax showing 
how this event endogenously increases the production subsidy affecting both the level of 
output and trade flows. Interesting, the authors test their predictions running cross-coun-
try regressions on agricultural sectoral data. Main results confirm key model propositions, 
showing that more stringent environmental standards in agriculture are associated with 
larger direct transfers to farmers. 
26 Under consumption externality, the same logic implies that the equilibrium government green policy will be a 
consumption tax on the polluting good, and a trade tax necessary for distributing income from unorganized to 
organized interest groups. 
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Lai (2005 and 2007) and Kawahara (2014) represent further refinement of the inter-
action between trade liberalization and environmental standards in a GH model setting. 
Interestingly, Kawahara (2014) following Mitra (1999) considered the case where interest 
groups are endogenously given. In particular, they showed that, under certain conditions, 
unilateral trade liberalization in a large country importing a pollution good, might raise 
(endogenously) inefficient environmental standards in another (small) exporting country. 
Similarly, Fredriksson and Matschke (2016) extend the GH model to the federal system 
case (e.g. the US), showing that trade liberalization leads to a decline in pollution taxes, 
regardless whether these taxes are set at federal (centralized) or local (decentralized) level, 
and increases welfare.27 
From an empirical point of view results are mixed, in the sense that more open econ-
omies affect differently emissions of several pollutants, but tend to reduce SO2 in many 
countries (see Frankel and Rose, 2005). An interesting application is the one by Eder-
ington and Minier (2003), who studied the extent to which environmental policy repre-
sents a secondary trade barrier. In line with the endogenous trade policy literature and in 
particular with the important contribution of Trefler (1993), these authors accounts for 
the inherent endogeneity problems in studying the impact of the stringency of environ-
mental standards on trade flows. Main results show that import-competing industries are 
under regulated in the environmental area, but also that lower tariff rates are associated 
with more stringent standards, i.e. government uses environmental regulation as a second-
ary means in providing protection to domestic import-competing industries.28 To date, 
however, a formal test of the GH model in the domain of environmental standards, that 
exploits information on lobby campaign contributions, does not exist yet. One possible 
reason is that, when secondary policy issues such as environmental policy are considered, 
electoral incentives matter more than lobby contributions, as argued by List and Sturm 
(2006). We will come back on this paper and this important hypothesis later.
5.3 Protection for sale and food quality standards 
As it is well known, agriculture and food industry represent, by far, sectors where 
the diffusion of NTMs, and in particular SPS/TBT standards, is more pervasive. One 
of the first applications of the GH model to study food (quality) standards is the work 
by Swinnen and Vandemoortele (2008 and 2011).29 These authors introduced two main 
changes into the standard GH model. First, the modelled standard, s, addresses a consum-
er externality, e.g. it guarantees a minimum quality level or safety features to a credence 
good and, as such, it increases consumers’ welfare. Second, differently from GH, one key 
27 Other applications studied how free trade impacts the burden sharing of environmental policies between pro-
ducers and consumers, and the implication of the stringency of environmental standards (see, e.g., Gulati, 2008). 
28 By combining data on environmental regulation at the country level with data on pollution intensity at the 
industry level, Broner et al. (2012) showed that countries with laxer environmental policy have a comparative 
advantage in pollution industries. This represents one of the few robust empirical evidence supporting the pol-
lution-haven hypothesis, namely the idea that because the stringency of regulation varies across countries (and 
sectors), this affects the location of polluting industries in countries with more laxer environmental regulation, 
e.g. in developing countries. 
29 These and subsequent papers by the same authors are summarized and extended in Swinnen et al. (2015). 
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assumption is that consumers, not only producers, are organized into an interest group 
lobbying the government through campaign contributions.30 On the production side, the 
structure is similar to GH and the standard is assumed to affect only the firms’ variable 
costs, as in Marette and Beghin (2010) and many others. 
In this setting, defining social welfare W(s) as the sum of producers profit ΠP and 
consumers surplus ΠC, the government objective function Ω(s) can be written as
φ φ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )= + +s C s C s W s Ω  C C P P , (3)
where CC and CP are the lobby contributions of consumers and producers, and ϕC and 
ϕP represent the relative weight government attach to consumers and producers interests, 
respectively. Following GH, the government will set the political optimal standard, s#, by 
maximizing consumer and producer group’ contributions, conditional to social welfare. 
Under these assumptions, the authors find several interesting results. First, in contrast 
with the socially optimal tariff in a small open economy, where t* = 0, the socially optimal 
standard may be strictly positive, s* > 0. In fact, although this could lead to a trade reduc-
tion effect, it can improve domestic welfare when the quality standard induced increase in 
consumer welfare more than compensates the producer implementation costs. Then, wheth-
er the standard can be defined as “protectionist” or not strictly depends by its definition. If 
we focus on the home country national welfare (the so-called domestic-efficiency argument) 
then the standard is not protectionist. Differently, if we focus on the world welfare, as Fis-
cher and Serra (2000) did, then the social optimal standard may be protectionist.31 
Moreover, the authors highlight two key dimensions for analyzing the political opti-
mal standards in an open economy: first, the issue of over- or under-standardization; sec-
ond, whether the standard is protectionist or not, namely if the standard results in higher 
domestic producer profits at the expense of domestic consumers. When ϕP > ϕC, the pub-
lic standard is always protectionist, although it can result in both over- (s# > s*) or under- 
(s# < s*) standardization. Over-standardization happens when producers’ profits rise with 
a higher standard ∂Π ∂ >s( / 0)P  at s*. By contrast, under-standardization occurs when the 
producer profits decrease with the standard ( ∂Π ∂ <s/ 0P ) at s*, implying the protection-
ist optimal standard to be lower than the social optimum.
Differently, when φ φ>C P , government weights more consumers interest in setting its 
optimal standard. In this case the result will be reversed, namely over-(under) standardi-
zation will occur when the consumer welfare is increasing (decreasing) with the standard 
∂Π ∂ s( / 0)C  at s*. What is interesting from this results is that, although the politically 
public standard s# will be sub-optimal, it will never be protectionist, ceteris paribus. 
30 The assumption that consumers are politically organized and, therefore, they make campaign contributions, is 
mainly the result of the observation that in some countries, e.g. European ones, consumers can be organized into 
interest groups, also through political parties representing their interests (see Swinnen et al., 2015). The prob-
lem with the empirical implementation of this framework is that very rarely, even in the US, consumer groups 
make direct campaign contributions. However, the informational lobby approach used by Belloc (2015) may be a 
promising strategy to overcome this issue.
31 This line of reasoning has been proposed in the trade literature by Baldwin (1970), who argues that a mea-
sure could be defined protectionist if it lowers real global income. This “cosmopolitan-efficiency case”, using the 
word of Bhagwati (1988), is particular relevant to issues such as the design of international trade regimes, i.e. the 
WTO. On this point, see also the discussion in Beghin et al. (2015).
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The above discussion highlights the conceptual difficulty behind the analysis of 
trade effects of standards in general, and in particular when political motives are taken 
into consideration. Under this framework, the classification of NTMs as protectionist 
or not is a priori difficult and uncertain, as such standards should be analyzed carefully 
and case-by-case. This conclusion appears in line with the inherent difficulty to find a 
solution to many international trade disputes over food and environmental standards 
within the WTO.
From an empirical point of view, no paper to date has tested explicitly the pre-
dictions outlined above on the determinants of quality standards using information 
on both producers and consumers lobby activities.32 Pacca and Olper (2016) tested the 
GH model on US manufacturing sectors using as policy variable NTMs from UNC-
TAD-Trains related to 2014. Interesting, from an inspection of the different US NTMs 
used in that study, one rapidly concludes that more than 85% of them are now SPS 
and TBT measures. Their results confirms the GH model predictions, irrespective to 
the fact that, today, the US protection structure and import penetration are totally dif-
ferent than 25 years ago. Yet, the supposed role of the consumer lobby activity is not 
still considered in this empirical application due to the intrinsic difficulty of measuring 
it. Moreover, to test seriously the extension of the GH model to NTMs, one has also to 
recognize the externality component of the NTMs, e.g. along the line of Beghin et al. 
(2015b). Yet, this raises further conceptual and empirical issues to the correct specifi-
cation of the GH model. 
Belloc (2015) presents one of the few applications to the European Union of a lob-
by model to explain the formation of NTMs. Since data on lobby contributions are not 
available for Europe, she relies on informational lobby, namely information on the partici-
pation of national and international business organization in the European Commission 
consultations on trade issues. Merging this original information with NTMs at tariff line 
level from 1999 to 2007, she was able to exploit the panel structure of the dataset, showing 
that participation in consultation meetings increases the probability to find NTMs at the 
industry level. From a theoretical point of view, the author extended a lobbying model of 
trade policy formation in the spirit of the GH model, to informational lobby. 
Empirical evidence on the economic and political determinants of food standards are 
provide by Li et al. (2014). In particular, they investigated the determinants of the maxi-
mum residue limits (MRLs) on pesticides and veterinary drugs, showing that MRLs are 
stricter in countries with high income and larger population, and in sectors with com-
parative disadvantage. Interesting, they also found that MRLs and import tariffs are poli-
cy substitutes. 
Finally, Vigani and Olper (2013) studied the determinants of GMO standards across 
60 developed and developing countries. Their main findings showed that the stringency 
of GMO standards are growing in the country comparative disadvantage in agriculture, 
in the size of the rural population, in the parallel restriction in environmental regula-
tion, and so on. They also found a strong (non-linear) effect of the share of private media 
outlets on the stringency of GMO regulations. This result supports the view that, when 
32 In the domain of agricultural and food trade policy, Gawande and Hoeckman (2006) and Lopez (2008), tested 
the basic GH model on US data. Main results show that campaign contributions from industry lobbies are cen-
tral in explaining the cross-industry variations in the protection structure of both NTMs and tariffs. 
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NTMs address consumers’ sensitive issues, the way the different media outlets inform 
them becomes a key element of the political economy of standards.33 
5.4 Protection for sale and standards when firms are heterogeneous 
To date, only few papers have studied the political economy of a public standard 
within a firms’ heterogeneity model. Abel-Koch (2013), building on Bombardini (2008), 
extended the basic GH framework relaxing the assumption of identical firms. In line with 
the empirical evidence on lobby behavior (Bombardini, 2008), it is assumed that only the 
largest and the most efficient firms will lobby together for NTMs, as they gain the most 
from their introduction (see Section 3). 
In the differentiated good sector all firms with marginal costs c ∈ (0, cL] are organ-
ized into a single lobby L, with the upper bound of the marginal cost of these firms low-
er than the cut-off for selling in the Home market cH (cL < cH). Instead, all firms with 
marginal costs c > cL do not join the lobby.34 The welfare of this lobby is then the joint 
welfare of its member, pi pi( ) ( )= +s sWL HL EL  , with the last term indicating the profit of 
Home exporting firms ( π E
L ), that is clearly unaffected by the (Home) standard s. The 
equilibrium trade policy is obtained by maximizing a weighted social-welfare function, 
φ pi( ) ( ) ( )= +s W s sΩ HL , in which organized Home firms are weighted 1 + ϕ, while non-
organized (small) firms and consumers are only weighted ϕ. From this maximization pro-
cess the government sets the political optimal standard, s#.
The model assumes that the standard, s, does not address any consumption external-
ity, but represents a “pure” non-tariff measure to trade, like several NTMs do. Under this 
assumption, the social planner optimal standard will be s* = 1, namely no standard into 
the Home market. Finally, the standard increases the fixed costs of accessing the Home 
market for both the Home and Foreign firms, by a factor s ∈ [1, ∞).
Suppose now that the lobby’s marginal gain in profits, and thus the Home govern-
ment’s marginal gain in political contributions, is higher than the weighted marginal loss 
in social welfare from introducing a NTM, namely 
pi( ) ( )∂
∂
+
∂
∂
>
W s
s
s
s
0HD
L# #
 at s* = 1. 
Then, Home government has an incentive to deviate from the socially optimum, setting 
s# > 1. The equilibrium level of the optimal government standard s# resulting from this 
lobby game is a function of several parameters related to the standard’s induced fixed and 
variable costs on Foreign and Home firms, the distribution of firms’ marginal costs in the 
two countries, and the weight the Home government puts on social welfare. Interestingly, 
it can be shown that the political optimal standard is decreasing in the import penetration 
ratio at Home, a result that mimics the baseline GH model. This is because, when For-
eign firms become more competitive relative to Home firms, due to a reduction in trade 
costs or an increase in their productivity, the import penetration ratio will increase and 
the profit-shifting effect of the standard on Home firms will become weaker, reducing the 
incentive to lobby for the standard. 
33 Vigani et al. (2012) in studying the trade effects of GMO standards showed that when GMO regulations are 
treated as endogenous in the trade equation, their trade reduction effect increases substantially. 
34 The basic model assumes that there is only one lobby (sector). 
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This result is important since it suggests that liberalizing trade and fostering compe-
tition from abroad will lower the equilibrium level of the optimal standard, by reducing 
the gains from the standard of the (large) Home firms. As a consequence, the model pre-
dicts a positive relationship between tariffs and NTMs, that within this framework are thus 
complements, rather than substitutes (Abel-Koch, 2013). 
An important extension is referred to the interaction between Home and Foreign gov-
ernments. Here, the result depends on how the two governments interact, non-coopera-
tively or cooperatively. In the first case the result is identical to the unilateral trade poli-
cy determination summarized above. Instead, when the NTMs are set cooperatively in a 
trade negotiation and countries are symmetric (i.e. same shape parameter), the equilibri-
um level of the standard which restricts market access for small firms will be higher than 
in the non-cooperative case. This is due to the fact that also the lobby of large Foreign 
firms has a “voice” on the Home government objective function, when policies are set in 
an international trade agreement (see Grossman and Helpman, 1995).35
Finally, when it is assumed that NTMs address a consumption externality, the con-
sumer loss from the variety reduction effect induced by the optimal standard will be com-
pensated by consumer gains of addressing the externality. Yet and interesting, the overall 
results remain unchanged, and the only difference is that even in the absence of lobby-
ing, it may be beneficial to introduce this kind of NTM, at least when the positive welfare 
effect on consumer health outweighs the negative effect on product varieties. 
To date, no empirical application tested these predictions using as dependent variable 
behind-the-border measures. However, Bombardini (2008) exploiting the same dataset of 
Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000), showed that US industries characterized by higher 
firm size dispersion obtain a higher level of protection because they are more active in 
lobbying. 
5.5 The role of elections and political competition 
The first attempt to study environmental policy with a voting model is made by Con-
gleton (1992), who applied the median voter approach contrasting the policy selection 
under autocracy and democracy. The simple intuition is that authoritarians tend to prefer 
a lower environmental standard with respect to the median voter, because decision mak-
ers in democracies have a smaller marginal cost for pollution control than authoritarians 
do. Overall, the author finds cross-country support to this prediction. However, more 
recently Fredriksson et al. (2005) qualified both theoretically and empirically this result, 
showing that what matters is not democracy per se but the interaction between voters par-
ticipation and political competition, other than environmental pressure groups.
McAusland (2003) uses a median voter model to explain environmental policy in 
a small open economy with two sectors - a clean and a polluting one - considering 
also the role of inequality and trade in affecting the behavior of heterogeneous voters. 
35 When countries are not symmetric, the shape parameter of the productivity distribution differs. Suppose that 
firm size is more dispersed in Home than in Foreign, then the standard implemented in Home reduces the 
aggregate profits from exporting of Foreign firms, and its social welfare, as showed in Section 3. Interesting, in 
a non-cooperative setting this will lead to over-standardization from a global welfare point of view. Instead, in a 
cooperative setting this negative externality is taken into account and leads to under-standardization. 
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Contrary to the conventional view, when the economy is closed to international trade, 
richer voters prefer a weaker environmental policy than poor voters. Yet, opening to 
trade affects the political optimal policy, since in this case the price of goods is less 
affected by the change in the environmental policy, and therefore changes the voters’ 
preferences towards it.
Sturm (2006) modelled an environmental standard using a political agency model 
where the government (the agent) searches political accountability from voters (the prin-
cipal). The author studied how the standard raised by the Home (importer) country, can 
be challenged as “green protectionism” by the Foreign (exporter) country. Home politi-
cians have an informational advantage in evaluating the probability that Foreign exported 
goods cause health or environmental damage, creating an intrinsic divergence between the 
Home and the Foreign government. Main results show that there exists a political equilib-
rium in which the importing country applies a more stringent standard than the export-
ing country, a situation that can be due to both too lax standards in the exporting country 
or too stringent standards in the importing country.
List and Sturm (2006) apply the political agency model above to study how politicians 
decide on both a frontline policy issue and a secondary policy issue, i.e. environmental 
policy. The key prediction of the model is that the incumbent government manipulates the 
secondary (environmental) policy to attract voters. Using US States and panel data econo-
metrics the authors find that US States environmental expenditures are determined by 
electoral incentives and the degree of electoral competition. This result is in contrast with 
the popular view that secondary policies are largely determined by lobbying.
One limit of the Sturm (2006) approach is that it does not consider lobbying as a 
determinant of environmental policy, disregarding a key element of the policy making. 
The first attempt to consider simultaneously electoral incentives and lobbying contri-
butions is due to Besley and Coate (2001), who combine the citizen-candidate model 
of representative democracy with the GH menu-action model of lobbying. The model 
is based on a three-stage game.36 One of the most interesting result from this model-
ling framework is that lobbying may not matter at all for policy outcomes when there 
is electoral competition, subject to certain conditions, i.e. when the public good policy 
is continuous. More in general, the authors conclude that both lobbying and electoral 
competition should be considered to understand the policy game, as well as the nature 
of the policy. 
An interesting model that consider lobbying and electoral incentives together is the 
one of Yu (2005), who adds the relevant concept of direct and indirect lobbying, with 
the latter referring to the lobbying effort to send message to citizens for influencing their 
preferred policy. Yu (2005) applied the model to environmental policy.37 In general, the 
model predicts complementarity between direct (money contribution) and indirect (mes-
sages) lobbying. However, it also showed that, under certain condition, e.g. when public 
persuasion of environmentalists is substantially stronger than for industrialists, a substitu-
tion relationship between indirect and direct lobbying comes out from the model. This is 
36 In the first stage, citizens decide whether to run for office; in the second, utility maximizing voters express 
their electoral preferences; in the third stage, the candidate will select the political optimal policy. 
37 See Jaeck et al. (2015) for a recent application of the Yu (2005) model logic of indirect lobbying to the case of 
sustainability standards, related to biofuel in the EU and US. 
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consistent with the observed behavior of US green groups where the effort in indirect lob-
bying tends to overcome the direct ones.38 
Finally, when electoral competition is taken into account, how this competition trans-
lates to policy outcomes depends also on electoral rules and institutions (Persson and 
Tabellini, 2000). Starting from this consideration, Fredriksson and Millimet (2004) studied 
the formation of environmental standards in different electoral systems contrasting major-
itarian versus proportional electoral rules. Under majoritarian rule with single-member 
districts, a party needs to receive only 50% of the vote in 50% of the districts to win an 
election. This implies that political parties may focus on a subset of the population rath-
er than maximizing aggregate welfare (Persson and Tabellini, 2000), making majoritarian 
systems more grounded in local interests (Milesi-Ferretti et al., 2002), and/or inducing a 
district majoritarian bias in public policy (Grossman and Helpman, 2005). In contrast, a 
party needs 50% of the national vote to win under a proportional system. Consistently 
with this intuition, Fredriksson and Millimet (2004) show that indeed governments set 
stricter environmental policies under proportional electoral systems, as opposed to the 
majoritarian one.39
6. The role of international agreements and global value chain 
This section discusses the problem of international trading rules over NTMs shortly. 
The economics literature on this topic is quite complex, and in recent years experienced a 
new revival motivated by the Doha Round crisis, the proliferation of new form of prefer-
ential trade agreements (i.e. deep PTAs) and, notably, the increasing importance of trade 
in intermediated goods, outsourcing and the role of global value chain.
6.1 International trading rules over NTMs 
As shown above, both domestic interest groups and/or opportunistic politicians 
behavior may influence the formation of protectionism public standards. This often hap-
pens as a by-product of a trade liberalization process.40 In theory, this government regula-
tory capture could be prevented by negotiating international agreements not only on trade 
policy (e.g. tariffs), but also on environmental and food standards (Copeland, 1990; Maggi 
and Rodriguez-Clare, 1998; WTO, 2012; Swinnen et al., 2015). 
Yet, given the complexity of the effects of many regulatory standards, there is an 
intrinsic difficulty in setting and applying international rules. Moreover, this difficult is 
also the consequence of the incomplete contract nature of these rules, as by definition 
38 Interestingly, recent evidence on the lobby’s behavior in the US highlighted the existence of an inverted 
U-shaped relationship between money contributions and workers/voters controlled by the lobby (see Bombar-
dini and Trebbi, 2011). In other words, when an interest group controls many voters, it need less money to reach 
the same lobby’s result. 
39 Interestingly, Heller and Holahan (2013) by contrasting electoral rules with the data of the Comparative Man-
ifesto Project on party positions, showed that proportional rules significantly increase the probability that the 
political parties position is pro-environment. 
40 This is because trade liberalization, by inducing the elimination of tariffs, left governments without the first-
best policy instrument to exploit term-of-trade effects (see Staiger, 2012, for a discussion of this point). 
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they cannot specify standards for products that may arise in the future (Battigalli and 
Maggi, 2003; Sturm, 2006). All this precludes the possibility to write efficient international 
agreements over standards. 
There are several and diverse approaches to standards in international agreements 
(WTO, 2012). The so called “Shallow integration” agreements leave substantial autono-
my to national governments in setting standards. “Non-discrimination” and the related 
“National treatment” in the GATT Agreement (articles I and III, respectively) are exam-
ples of this approach. By contrast, “Deep integration” agreements on domestic policy 
regulation aim not only at coordinating border protection, but also at addressing more 
complex coordination problems. The principle of “Harmonization” is an example of 
deep integration. 
Considering the current WTO rules, it is not always clear if they should be inter-
preted as a shallow or deeper integration agreement. This is because, on the one end, the 
SPS and TBT agreements incorporate also harmonization through the use of international 
standards, and include obligations that are additional to the GATT non-discrimination 
rules such as, for instance, the need to ensure that standard requirements are not unnec-
essarily trade restrictive. On the other hand, when a NTM is inconsistent with the non-
discrimination obligations of GATT Articles I and III, it eventually may be justified under 
one of the general exceptions of GATT Article XX.41
More in general, choosing which kind of approach works better to solve the countries’ 
coordination problem over NTMs depends on several factors and also on the level of the 
externality that the NTM is intended to address. For instance, Costinot (2008) focusing 
on product standards, highlighted that that mutual recognition, in case of local negative 
consumption externalities, may induce to set too lax standards because governments do 
not account for externalities generated by their export on foreign markets. By contrast, 
national treatment has the opposite effect, i.e. too stricter standards, since the government 
does not take foreign’ compliance costs into account. 
The political economy literature identifies two key issues that a trade agreement might 
solve (Bagwell and Staiger, 2010). First, governments may view trade agreements as help-
ing them avoid beggar-my-neighbor policies – in particular term-of-trade effects – that 
are unilaterally attractive but mutually inefficient (Bagwell and Staiger, 1999).42 A second 
reason is related to the commitment value of international agreements, namely the idea 
that, ex-post, trade agreements render the government less prone to the pressure of spe-
cial interest groups (Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare, 1998).
One of the first formal analyses of international trading rules over standards is the 
Bagwell and Staiger (2001) work, developed within the GH model and stressing the 
term-of-trade motives. Focusing specifically on the trade effects of domestic stand-
ards, and so ruling out “global common” issues, they argued that current WTO rules 
– i.e. reciprocity and non-discrimination – with small changes, are already equipped to 
41 Exceptions of the GATT art. XX relevant for NTMs should assure that “nothing in this Agreement shall be 
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any Member of measures” necessary to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health, or relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources. 
42 See Broda et al. (2008) and Ludema and Mayda (2013), for interesting empirical evidence in support of the 
role of country market power (term-of-trade effect) in determining the tariffs’ level, for both non-WTO and 
WTO countries, respectively. 
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address the raising issue of the proliferation of domestic standards. Accordingly, negoti-
ations over tariffs alone, coupled with an effective “market access preservation rule” that 
prevents governments from subsequently manipulating their domestic policy choices 
to undercut the market access implications of their tariff commitments, can bring gov-
ernments to the efficiency frontier (Bagwell and Staiger, 2001).43 Yet, recently, Antràs 
and Staiger (2012a) showed that when international prices are determined as a result 
of bilateral bargaining – e.g. between the domestic purchaser and the foreign supplier – 
the above result is overturned, namely one need for deep integration where direct nego-
tiations occur over both tariffs and behind-the-border policies. We will return shortly 
on this issue. 
Limào and Tovar (2011), focused, instead, on the commitment value of internation-
al agreements. These authors investigated theoretically and empirically the interaction 
between government commitment over tariffs and the subsequent use of (less efficient) 
NTMs. The paper extends the basic GH model to the government choice over NTMs, 
modelling the political value of commitment over tariffs in international trade agreements 
as it improves the bargaining position of a weak government relative to domestic inter-
est groups. The authors tested the model predictions on Turkey considering tariffs cap 
introduced within the WTO and the PTA with the EU. Main results showed that tariff 
commitments in trade agreements increase the likelihood and restrictiveness of NTMs but 
not enough to offset the original tariff reductions,44 broadly confirming that (domestic) 
bargaining motive is an important source of the political value of commitment in interna-
tional agreements.
Yet, there are other interpretations on the recent diffusion of NTMs, especially when 
developed countries are considered. For example, Bagwell and Staiger (2013), argued that 
the proliferation of NTMs particularly in developed countries, at a certain degree, could 
be the result of what they call “globalization fatigue”. With this term, they refer to the fact 
that the increase in NTMs as substitutes to tariffs could be seen as a second-best policy to 
leave room for negotiations with developing countries. Indeed, developed countries’ tar-
iffs have been lowered too much to represent a good “bargaining chip” toward developing 
countries. The evidence by Beverelli et al. (2014) discussed in Section 2 is consistent with 
this interpretation.
6.2 Global value chain and trade policy 
Governments’ incentive to cooperate on international agreements over standards 
could be also the result of the effect of NTMs on firms’ fixed costs for entering foreign 
markets, as summarized in the firms heterogeneity model discussed in Section 4.2. In this 
setting, NTMs could determine the extent of competition. NTMs that affect fixed costs, 
besides acting like a tariff, and thus affecting international terms-of-trade, would have an 
additional effect on market entry decisions in the foreign country. Moreover, NTMs, by 
43 Note however that, in the growing situations where international externalities are not pecuniary – such as 
global warming – this focus on the term-of-trade motive looses importance.
44 Limào and Tovar (2011) also emphasized that, although in the majority of the investigated situations the gov-
ernment justified the introduction of the new NTMs using consumer and/or environmental concerns, the select-
ed NTMs never really account for these externalities. 
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imposing fixed costs, will induce trade concentration in larger and more efficient firms 
(WTO, 2012; Abel-Koch, 2013).45 
The proliferation of global chains coordinated by large players increases the interna-
tional interdependency and may provide a rational for a deep cooperation on NTMs (and 
tariffs) within trade agreement (WTO, 2012). In fact, other than spillovers associated to 
the term-of-trade effect, the break-up of the production process across different countries 
creates new forms of cross-border spillovers (Staiger, 2012; Antràs and Staiger, 2012b; 
Blanchard, 2014). 
One of the salient characteristics of global value chain is represented by the surge of 
trade in (processed) intermediate goods. This is the result of different phenomena, such 
as the strong reduction of the costs of international transactions – due to both declining 
trade costs and ICT – and the rising role of global players and foreign direct investments-
FDIs (see Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez, 2014). 
Intermediate input purchases tend to be associated with significant lock-in effects for 
both buyers and sellers. This is because intermediate input varieties are often customized 
to the needs of the buyers, incorporating a growing amount of relationship specific invest-
ments, which may be hard to recoup when transacting with alternative parties. Moreover, 
offshoring often involves the costly search for suitable foreign suppliers or foreign buyers, 
which makes separations costly and thereby provides another source of lock-in (Antràs 
and Staiger, 2012b). 
These global value chain linkages alter the conventional calculus of trade policy (Blan-
chard et al., 2016). Introducing import tariffs hurt those upstream domestic firms that 
supply inputs to foreign producers, as tariffs reduce the value of foreign goods, and so 
the revenue accruing to domestic input suppliers. These linkages reduce the governments’ 
incentives to impose a tariff. Similarly, when domestic firms use foreign value added in 
production, a part of the gains due to an import tariff translates back through the supply 
chain to foreign input suppliers (Blanchard et al., 2016). The extent to which the current 
institutional framework, originally drafted for a world trade in final goods, can address 
this new forms of interdependency, appears to be an open and difficult question (WTO, 
2012; Blanchard, 2014). 
Antrà and Staiger (2012b) reported an interesting empirical evidence in support of 
the ideas that actual WTO rules do not work well in presence of global value chain inter-
actions. Specifically, for a sample of 16 countries that joined the WTO after its creation in 
1995, they showed that tariff concessions were markedly greater in sectors with low levels 
of input customization than in sectors with high levels of input customization (Figure 8).46 
Conceptual and empirical works on the role played by global value chains in affecting 
government’ incentives over trade policy is still in its infancy. Yet, important contributions 
already exist. For example, Orefice and Rocha (2014) provide one of the first empirical 
evidences showing that there exists a two-way link between deep PTAs and the share in 
trade attributable to vertical specialization. In particular, the authors showed that sign-
45 See Alfaro et al. (2015) for a recent model of global value chains where heterogeneous firms decide the bound-
ary along the value chain. See Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzales (2015) for an overview of recent global supply chain 
stylized facts.
46 Antrà and Staiger (2012) measured the sectoral level of inputs customization as the share of an industry’s 
inputs not traded in organized exchanges (see Nunn, 2007).
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ing deeper agreements increases trade in production networks between member countries 
by almost 12 percentage points on average. In addition, the impact of deep integration is 
more significant for industries that by their nature require higher levels of regulation.
Blanchard and Matschke (2015) combine firm-level data on US foreign affiliate activi-
ty with detailed measures of US trade policy to study the interlink of offshoring and PTAs. 
In line with the theoretical expectation they showed positive correlation among US trade 
preferences and offshoring activity, and the size of the economic effect is important.47 
Blanchard et al. (2016), introduced cross-border supply chain linkages into the stand-
ard terms-of-trade model of trade policy formation based on the GH framework. They 
used this model to study how government objectives over final good tariffs depend on the 
nationality of the value-added content embodied in home and foreign final goods. The key 
prediction of the model is that the surge of global value chain trade is reshaping the polit-
ical incentive over trade policy, by erasing distinction between final goods made at home 
versus made abroad. 
Theoretically, Blanchard et al. (2016) add two important contributions. First, they 
showed that, considering the value added content of trade in the production process 
changes the mapping from prices to income, altering government incentives over trade 
policy. Secondly, by incorporating this new incentives into a political economy model, 
they reach several new results. For example, the domestic content embodied in foreign 
final goods dampens a country’s incentive to manipulate its terms-of-trade. Interesting, 
47 For example, they estimated that a 10% increase in US foreign affiliate exports to the US is associated with a 
4% increase in the rate of preferential duty-free access. 
Figure 8. Percent deviation from concession by tercile of input customization measure.
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Blanchard et al. (2016) using bilateral applied tariffs, temporary trade barriers (i.e. anti-
dumping and countervailing duties) and value-added contents of trade, find strong sup-
port to the model predictions. 
Finally, Gawande et al. (2015) investigated the trade policy response to the 2008 crisis 
in seven large emerging countries. The main aim of the paper was the attempt to under-
stand the extent to which the country participation in global value chains represented an 
important economic factor in driving the trade policy response to the crisis. As it is well 
known, the effect of border protection in presence of trade in intermediate goods is signif-
icantly amplified simply because “goods” crossed the country borders several times (Hum-
mels and Yi, 2001). Interestingly, although they find heterogeneity in the country-level 
results, overall they support the notion that the position of domestic and foreign exporters 
in the global supply chain exerted offsetting forces in many countries. In particular, the 
demand for cheap inputs by downstream users, and the demand for a country’s exports 
by vertically specialized producers in partner countries, exerted countervailing pressure 
against protectionist pressure from domestic lobbies. Hence, the main message of this 
paper’s results is that today the nature of trade produces powerful incentives against pro-
tectionism, which goes well behind the standard term-of-trade motives. 
7. Concluding remarks 
Agricultural economists have been traditionally aware that the key determinants of 
agricultural and food policy are largely political in nature, and this also applies to envi-
ronmental and food standards, as it clearly emerges from this survey. There is a long and 
important literature that documents this awareness, taking the peculiarities of NTMs into 
account and raising new theoretical and empirical challenges. As briefly discussed in Sec-
tion 2, building a sound model on the economic effects of environmental and food quality 
standards is difficult. For the same reason, modelling them as endogenous response to the 
political process should have higher priority in our research agenda. 
There are several areas where further progress is needed. First, political economy 
models in general, and in particular when applied to the formation of regulatory stand-
ards, need to consider simultaneously both electoral incentives and lobbying behavior 
(and their possible interaction). Some preliminary effort has been done from a theoreti-
cal point of view (e.g. Yu, 2005; Swinnen et al., 2015). Yet, empirical tests of the model 
predictions are rare, and often too simplistic for understanding the complex interaction 
between voters, lobbying and political interests. In particular, models of environmental 
and quality standards are waiting for sound empirical tests. Here, the difficulty is to con-
sider more seriously the exact role and behavior of different interests (e.g. “green” versus 
“industrialist” groups), as well as whether and how consumers’ and voters’ interests really 
matter. 
Second, the underlying modelling structure to study the political economy of stand-
ards should be the one of monopolistic competition with firms’ heterogeneity. This is not 
only because this modelling framework accounts for more realistic features of the effects 
of standards, but because it adds a new important dimension in the coalition formation 
in favor or against NTMs. Indeed, with firms’ heterogeneity the traditional cross-secto-
ral conflict over trade policy is broken-down over the within-sector dimension depend-
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ing on firms’ characteristics. The extension of the GH model to firms heterogeneity could 
perhaps contribute to solve some empirical inconsistency of the model, as suggested by 
Chang and Willmann (2014). Yet, a downside of this approach is the need of detailed lob-
by and industry data at firm level to test the model predictions properly.
Third, the design of international rules over standards requires a better understand-
ing of the complex coordination problem between countries and firms. However, the 
policy implications for the effect of environmental and food standards from a model 
that includes more realistic details of the current globalization waves, i.e. the structure 
and linkages of modern GVCs, have not been developed yet.48 This perhaps represents 
one of the most compelling challenges for our profession, given the analytical complex-
ity of this literature and the necessity to adapt actual modelling tools to the peculiarity 
of agri-food value chains. Indeed, this emerging literature, briefly summarized in Sec-
tion 6, has been largely developed with specific manufacturing industries in mind, such 
as chemicals and electronics, where vertical specialization and global outsourcing are a 
fact, and focusing mainly on trade policy (tariffs). Although also the agri-food sector 
experienced an increase in vertical specialization, some features of this industry are still 
different and peculiar. For example, the dependence of the agricultural process on natu-
ral resources (land, water, and climatic conditions), the perishable nature of many food 
products, and differences in international transactions and contracts between players, 
raise further complexities calling for a careful adaptation of the current modelling tools. 
All that, clearly, could result in policy implications for regulatory standards that go in 
different directions with respect to what is emerging with reference to the manufactur-
ing industry. 
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